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A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation
Through a Feminist Jurisprudential Lens
KATE MCCABE

INTRODUCTION
The radical notion that women have voices and the intelligence to use
them has fueled the quest in this country for a recognition of women's rights.'
Battling a history that has failed to acknowledge their contributions and
arguably, their existence,2 women have struggled to have their stories told.'
The re-emergence of the women's movement in the latter half of the 20
century has resulted in changes in how contemporary women view themiselves
and their place in the world.4
Women's quest for recognition challenges the social, cultural, and legal
5
structures, demanding that women be heard and acknowledged. The legal
6 The rise of altersystem in particular has failed to hear women's stories.
native dispute resolution (ADR) during the last 25 years represents a
dissatisfaction with the legal system and an effort to transform the dispute
resolution process. As an ADR process that validates one's experience,
mediation invites women to tell their stories and to have them heard. The
nature of the process complements women's strengths and provides them with
an alternative forum, thus promising an opportunity for women to share their
individual and collective experiences.
This article explores the potential that mediation offers to women as a
forum to tell their stories in their own voices. Part I explains the process of
mediation. Part II examines the interplay of law, mediation and women,
suggesting that the adversarial system has failed to acknowledge women and
neglected to hear their voices or listen to their stories. This section also

(1989).

1.

See SARA M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA

2. See GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 4 (1986). "Until the most
these historians have been men, and what they have recorded is what men have done
past,
recent
and experienced and found significant." Id.
3. See DEENA METZGER, WRITING FOR YOUR LIFE: A GUIDE AND COMPANION TO THE
INNER WORLDS (1992).

4. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis:Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 176-79 (1982).
5. See BETTY FRIEDAN. THE SECOND STAGE (1981).
6. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The DialecticofRights andPolitics:Perspectivesfrom the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 609 (1986).
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investigates the role of mediation within the legal system and the dangers
adherent in that position. Part I introduces feminism and feminist
jurisprudence. Part IV looks at mediation as an alternative process and
explores the vitality of an "ethics of care" and the critical importance of
incorporating such an ethic into the dispute resolution processes. Part V
considers the dangers of mediation for women and suggests that what are
considered weaknesses should be viewed from a perspective of strength. Part
VI applies a feminist jurisprudential lens to mediation, advocating that
mediation in fact offers women greater opportunity to speak for themselves
and share their experiences as women than the traditional adjudicatory system.
The article concludes with the suggestion that a feminist framework should
continue to influence the future of mediation, ensuring that it remains a
woman-friendly process, holding the promise of giving women a place where
their voices are heard.
I. THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION
Mediation is a process in which a third party neutral (the mediator) works
to facilitate communication between the disputing parties. Often this expanded
communication results in a resolution of the dispute. By nature, it is a voluntary, 7 informal,' private process." Confidentiality rules often attach, and
information used or gained through the mediation process are not admissible
in the event adjudication follows.' Advantages of the process include its
nature, which allows the parties to retain control and decide the outcome."
This characteristic allows procedural flexibility and is more responsive to
parties' needs than traditional adjudication. 2 Because the parties determine

7.

Court-ordered mediation programs do exist and are growing in number. See JOAN

BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1985); LINDA R. SINGER,
SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BusINEss, FAMILIES AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

(1990).

8. Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2
LAw & INEQ. J. 21, 26 (1984). But see Richard L. Abel, Conservative Conflict and the
Reproduction of Capitalism: The Role of Informal Justice, 9 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 245, 249 (1981)
(arguing that advantages claimed for informal institutions are vague and inconsistent).
9. Rifkin, supra-note 8, at 26.
10. See Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to
Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants,
the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL 1 (1995); Jonathan M. Hyman, The
Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17 (1988).
11. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, Or Empowerment and
Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253,
267 (1989).
12. Id.
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the agreement, better solutions emerge in which the parties have a sense of3
the agreement.'
ownership and are more likely to voluntarily implement
Mediation is hailed as faster, more efficient, and less costly than
adjudication."
Mediation defies a "black law" definition, and a wide variety of mediator
I
roles and strategies are adopted and employed. I Robert A. Baruch Bush and
Joseph P. Folger describe a transformative mediation which offers the parties
an opportunity for empowerment and recognition in the process of resolving
for parties to
disputes. 6 Lon Fuller sees mediation as an opportunity
"reorient" themselves to the other's perspective. 7 Deborah Kolb describes
s
mediators as orchestrators and dealmakers.' Stulberg describes the mediator
9
as a catalyst, an educator, a translator, an agent of reality, and a scapegoat.'
The mediator may also be responsible for expanding the resources available
to the parties and becoming the bearer of bad news.'
Leonard Riskin has mapped out a mediator's grid, describing the
2
overarching style of the mediator as either facilitative or evaluative. ' The
mediator operates from a predominant quadrant on the grid, ranging from
narrow evaluative to broad facilitative. According to Riskin, the facilitative
mediator employs strategies and techniques designed to clarify and enhance
communication between the parties, while the evaluative mediator uses a style
designed to provide guidance to the parties. Similarly, Sibley and Merry

13.
(1982).
14.

Id. See also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation andLawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29,34-35

15.

See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL, MATERIALS ON MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE

Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harm's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the
Attorney Advocate, 23 GOIDEN GATE U.L. REv. 717(1993). But see Abel, supranote 8,at 246.

(forthcoming 2001); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984); KIMBER.EE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION:
PRiCILES AND PRACTICE (1994); NANCY H. ROGERS &CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW,
POLICY, PRACTICE (2nd ed. 1994).
16. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EPoWERMENT AND RECOGNITION XVII (1994).

17.
(1971).
18.

Lon L. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions,44 S.CAL L. REv. 305, 325

DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 23-45 (1983). Dealmakers see the role of the
as
mediator making deals. Id. at 41. Orchestrators see the mediator as a gatekeeper, providing
a forum in which parties meet. Id. at 42.
19. Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practiceof Mediation:A Reply to Professor
Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85. 91-94 (1981).

20. Id.at 93.

21. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996).

22.

Id.
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define two types of mediation styles, bargaining and therapeutic. 23 The
bargaining mediator strives to reach a settlement whereas the therapeutic
mediator works to help the parties communicate and identify areas of
agreement. 24
Regardless of the type of mediation and style employed, a prototypical
framework of the mediation session is definable. 2 In a typical mediation
session, the disputing parties meet with the mediator, who provides an opening
statement explaining the process, sets rules, and answers questions. Next, the
parties are given a chance to "tell their stories." The mediator may then choose
to meet with the parties individually in a caucus. A caucus is a confidential,
one-on-one meeting between the mediator and a disputing party and is often
an opportunity for the party to divulge information that he or she is
uncomfortable sharing with the other party or to step out from a posturing
position and share authentic concerns.26 After the mediator meets one-on-one
with each party, the group reassembles for additional dialogue and ultimately
an agreement.
Although the agreement is non-binding in a court of law, it may be
enforceable as a contract between the parties. 2 Agreements are often in
writing.2' Lawyers may or may not be present during the mediation session;
however, agreements may be contingent upon attorney approval. 29
As an alternative dispute process, mediation lends itself to disputes which
involve concerns not addressed in American jurisprudence, such as
apologies.30 It is a process well designed for disputants who are involved in
ongoing relationships, such as landlord and tenants, family members, and
neighbors.3" The process is a method which brings out the real needs at issue.
Most important, it offers an alternative to the adversarial courtroom battle
which is idealized as "American justice." ADR proponents argue that an

23. Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, MediatorSettlement Strategies, 8 LAw & POLY
7, 20 (1986).
24. Id. at 21.

25. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFICT (1986); see also supra note 15.

26. See JOSEPH B. STULBERG, TAKING CHARGEIMANAGING CONFLICT 107-122 (1987).
27. See Cathleen Cover Payne, Enforceabilityof MediatedAgreements, 1 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL 385, 388-397 (1986).
28. Id
29. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approachesto Ensuring Fairnessin Divorce Mediation,79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1346 (1995)

(arguing that attorney participation promotes fairness in process).
30. See Stephen B.Goldberg et al., Saying You're Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION. J.221 (1987).
31. Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality:Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (1985).
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adversarial system is inadequate to handle human problems and that
alternative dispute resolution processes provide a better means. 3 2 It is further
suggested that mediation widens access to justice for people not within the
dominant cultural group. 3
II. LAW, MEDIATION, AND WOMEN

As ADR in general and mediation in particular become integrated into
the existing legal hierarchy, discussions on mediation neglect the promise of
its key component, that it is an alternative dispute resolution method.
Analyzed according to the semantic connotations of the word "alternative,"
it may seem that mediation is a substitute for the formal legal system. The
strengths and weaknesses of mediation are evaluated in comparison to the
34
dominant system of dispute resolution, using the same language and stance.
The discussion focuses on mediation's very nature, its position as an
alternative, and being construed in that light, its paradigmatic boundaries will
always be within the framework of the adversarial legal structure.
Furthermore, because mediation is viewed in its alternative category as
something less than the formal adjudicatory method, participants can fall back
on "having their day in court" if the mediation "fails." Within that framework,
participants are instilled with the image that the parties are adversaries seeking
a kinder, gentler means to resolve their dispute, reserving the harsher litigation
option as a failsafe, in case the mediation does not result in settlement.
Mediation may also be viewed not as a means to settlement but as a
means to "exploring mutually acceptable outcomes."3 Under this rubric, four
core values underlying mediation are defined as: (1) promotion of selfactualization or self-determination of the individual disputants; (2) individual
responsibility for actions taken by disputants; (3) responsibility of the
disputant to understand the experience of others; and (4) responsibility to act
in ways acknowledging that understanding. 36 Employing these core values,
mediation offers the possibility of "acquiring truth by incorporating
32. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement In An Adversary Culture:A Tale of
Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991).
33. Treuthart, supra note 14, at 717. But see Abel, supra note 8, at 247.
34. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 13. "As ADR becomes institutionalized within
the court system, one can ask whether advocacy is one of the many tools of dispute resolution,
or whether alternative forms of dispute resolution will be captured by the dominant culture of
adversarial advocacy." Id.
35.

Beryl Blaustone, The Conflicts of Diversity, Justice,and Peace in the Theories of

Dispute Resolution, A Myth: Bridge Makers Who Face the Great Mystery, 25 U. TOL L. REV.

253, 257 n.10 (1994).
36. Id. at 258.
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everyone's version of the experience" and serves as the "theoretical rationale
for building understanding and agreement in any mediation process." '
Conversely, if the process works to perpetuate historical discrimination or bias
against subordinated classes, it is not mediation.3 s
Carrie Menkel-Meadow argues that "the adversary system may no longer
be the best method for our legal system to deal with all the matters that come
within its purview." 39 She suggests a variety of reasons for this idea, including
the ineffectiveness of using binary presentations of facts in a quest to learn the
truth, which acts to distort the truth, simplify complexity, and blur issues.'
Menkel-Meadow also criticizes the adversarial mind set for the way it teaches
people to act.4' As a whole, she suggests that the modern adversarial methods
lack a search for truth, particularly in a postmodern, diverse society in which
there are different types of truth dependent on one's viewpoint and
perspective."2 She envisions alternative dispute resolution models, including
mediation, as solutions to the adversarial mind set.' 3
As Menkel-Meadow warns, mediation is in danger of "becoming
corrupted by the persistence of adversarial values." The prominent view of
mediation as discussed and practiced is in danger of promoting prejudice
against subordinated groups, including women.' The language of law "can
make subordination seem natural and inevitable." Thus, participation in the
legal framework, be it in the courtroom or through a legalized mediation
process, reinforces the same hierarchical structure which mediation was
initially envisioned to combat.' "Law, in relation to women, is seen as a
measured and rational set of beliefs which at the same time asserts a

37.
38.
39.

Id. at257n.10.
Id. at 258-59.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 6.
Id at 10.
Id. at 13-14.
Id at 33-36.

Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).

44. Id. at37.

45. Delgado, supra note 31, at 1360-61 (abandoning the formal legal system leaves
subordinated groups without its protections).
46. Mar J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of

Coalition, 43 STAN. L REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (exploring the relationship between process and
the substance of coalition).
47. Blaustone, supra note 35, at 262.'he challenge in addressing diversity,justice and
peace in dispute resolution is to make choices which result from an integrated perspective on
difference and togetherness." Id.
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mythological vision which is believed by many to present an accurate
statement of the world."' 8
For women, maintaining a belief in the statements and solutions provided
by the adversarial courtroom can be particularly detrimental. A brief survey
of the landmark cases involving women's rights issues provides a context in
which the law's view of women is exemplified. Based on common law
notions, women were considered property of men, belonging to either their
fathers or their husbands.4 9 It was not until 1839 that the first state allowed
married women to own the property they held prior to marriage or received
during the marriage as bequest or gift. 5" State laws did not recognize women's
right to contract, a doctrine that was used to prevent Myra Bradwell from
admission to the Illinois State Bar.5 Justice Bradley, in concurrence, stated,
"[tihe paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother."5 2
The special role assigned to women by society and reinforced by the
legal system delegated women to the private sphere. Statutes regulated
women's ability to enter the marketplace, fortifying women's second-place
status and assuring their subordination to men. In upholding an Oregon statute
that limited women's participation in the workplace while leaving unregulated
men's participation, 3 Justice Brewer announced for the Supreme Court that
"it is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her
brother and depends upon him."' Furthermore, Justice Brewer stated "her
physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions - having
in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race - justify
legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man."55

48. Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory ofLaw and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83,
84-85 (1980).
49.
1 WILIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OFENGLAND 442 (Chittey
ed. 1826). "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
everything..." Id.
50. NORMA BAScH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAw 27 (1982). The first state passing a
married woman act was Mississippi.
51. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). The Supreme Court found that Bradwell's

incapacity to contract prevented her from performing "the duties and trusts that belong to the
office of an
52.
53.
54.
55.

attorney and counselor." Id. at 141 (Bradley, i., concurring).
Id.
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Id. at 422.
Id.
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Nationwide, legislation further solidified women's place in the private
56
sphere.
It required a Constitutional amendment to extend the right to vote to
women,5 7 yet even this electoral equal ground did not place women on even
footing with men in the eyes of the law. The notion of women as needing the
special (paternal) protection of the law has required women to request from
the courts rights unquestionably assumed by men. The formal equality
argument, based on application of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 8 is premised on the concept of equal rights for men
and women. In Reed v. Reed, the Supreme Court held that providing "a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other..
. is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... ...The Equal Protection
argument has led to a number of successes for women, 6' but has also exacted
a price. A formal equality argument evades the question of women's
differences, particularly biological, and instead attempts to fit women into the
defined categories of patriarchy. Responding to a formal equality argument,
the Supreme Court found that discrimination does not exist on the basis of sex
when pregnancy benefits are excluded." According to Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor:
The dilemma is this: if society does not recognize the fact
that only women can bear children, then "equal treatment"
ends up being unequal. On the other hand, if society
recognizes pregnancy as requiring special solicitude, it is a
slippery slope back to the "protectionist" legislation that
historically barred women from the workplace.62

56. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan legislation
disallowing women to work in a tavern unless owned by her husband or father); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington minimum wage law
applicable only to women); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding Florida statute
which automatically exempted women fromjury duty unless they expressly waive that privilege;
overturned on Sixth Amendment grounds in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)).

57.
58.

U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

59. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
60. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Orrv. Orr,440 U.S. 268 (1979).
61. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
62. Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia'sProgress,66 N.Y.U. L REV. 1546, 1554 (1991)
(Centennial Celebration: A Tradition of Women in the Law, Madison Lecture, in which Justice

O'Connor examines the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of women's rights).
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Discussions such as Justice O'Connor's fail to recognize discrimination
against women that is ingrained in the legal system. Considered by the United
States Supreme Court to be a semi-suspect class,. Legislation adversely
affecting women is held to intermediate review,63 reinforcing a legal hierarchy
which fails to acknowledge historic discrimination against women and serves
to subordinate women's positions as partners, parents, workers, and citizens.
"The social definition of women has been constructed around the needs of
men."' 6 This social definition, based on traditional concepts of "woman,"
results in an "under-personification of women."65 By defining femininity as
submissive, dependent and domestic, the construct of woman reinforces a
system of control by men.' This system in turn "reinforces itself in a circular
pattern. "67 Ultimately, the result of this definition of woman is 6an
incongruence between the image of "woman" and definition of "citizen., 1
As mediation adapts itself into the legal framework, it is in danger of
perpetuating this incongruence, leaving women in the same second-class
position they are in within the legal system. As mediation has moved toward
the mainstream, it has evolved along the traditional legal framework.6 9 The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in partnership
with the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, is currently
working on developing a Uniform Mediation Act7 ° governing the field, and as
mediation continues to be implemented in the court system, it begins to mirror
that system's characteristics. 7 "The difficulty in all of this rule setting and
mediation programming is that mediation is a subtle and perhaps even fragile
process that may be disrupted and even undermined by the good intentions to
manage it.""2 There are a number of ways in which mediation's connection

63. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) "Classification by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those

objectives."
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J. 447,452 (1984).
Id. at 455.
id. at 456.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 465.

69. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2.

70. Uniform Mediation Act (current draft), at www.abanet.org/dispute/webpolicy.html
and www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/. (last visited May 1. 2001).
71. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32; James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and
Hashing It Out: Is This The End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991)
(analyzing concerns and practices threatening to transform mediation from a consensual to a
coercive process).
72. Robert D. Benjamin, Mediation as a Subversive Activity (1998), available at
http://www.mediate.comarticles.
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with the court system jeopardizes the process, including framing the
settlement within legal guidelines. 3 This characteristic, it is argued, may
implicate the settlement in that it may be determinative of the settlement, as
opposed to the parties implementing their own agreement. Furthermore, the
design and implementation of court-referred mediation may impose a bias for
the mediator to adopt.7' In all, it is warned that "if mediation, as it is
programmed into the legal structure becomes just another cog in the system
to move cases or enforce preset notions of the correct result... mediation may
become merely a means to coerce social harmony and order.""' As a process
order," it is argued that mediation
"inherently at odds with the established
76
should remain a subversive activity.
Along similar lines, Janet Rifkin charges that the mediation debate "lacks
a careful questioning of law and alternative dispute programs from a feminist
perspective."" Accordingly, she argues that critics of mediation fail to explore
"the patriarchal paradigm of law as hierarchy, combat, and adversarialness,.
. . [which] therefore, generates only a certain kind of questioning of
mediation. ' 7' Examining and exploring the field of mediation from a feminist
perspective, and more specifically, through a feminist jurisprudential lens,
enables the dialogue to move out of the patriarchal legal framework, with-the
potential of providing women with a "room of their own" for dispute
resolution.

mI.

FEMINISM AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

Feminism is a growing, living, evolving idea,79 striving to define the
world through women's perspectives. It seeks to empower women on their
own terms.' As Adrienne Rich describes,
[T]he feminist movement could be said to be trying to
visualize and make way for a world in which abortion
73.

ld.

75.
76.

Id.
Id.

79.

See ROSEMARME TONG, FEMINST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION

80.

CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 22 (1987).

74. d. For example, the author highlights "the best interest of the child" concept used
in custody mediation, which has the potential to conflict with the mediator's neutrality. Id.
77. Rifkin, supra note 8, at 22 (arguing that inequality between men and women in
mediation is not clear in how the process operates in practice).
78. 14.

(1989). Tong categorizes the various theories of feminism as liberal feminism, Marxist
feminism, radical feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, socialist feminism, existentialist
feminism, and postmodem feminism.
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would not be necessary; a world free from poverty and rape,
in which young girls would grow up with intelligent regard
for and knowledge of their bodies and respect for their
minds, in which the socialization of women into
heterosexual romance and marriage would no longer be the
primary lesson of culture; in which single women could
raise children with a less crushing cost to themselves, in
which female creativity might or might not choose to
express itself in motherhood."'
Feminism "is a methodological expression of women's situation, in which the
struggle for consciousness is a struggle for world: for a sexuality, a history, a
culture, a community, a form of power, an experience of the sacred."82
Feminism recognizes the division in society between men and women, male
and female, and seeks an integration. 3 Feminism proceeds on the theory that
women have historically been subordinated by a society developed and
maintained within a patriarchal framework." Patriarchy, as defined by
feminism, is any group or organization "in which capabilities assigned to
women are relegated generally to the mystical and aesthetic and excluded
realms, these realms being regarded as separate
from the practical and political
85
exclusive."
mutually
and
Feminism, in challenging this view, employs a perspective of women and
incorporates methods which embody that perspective. Feminist method
demands a questioning of everything,8 6 recognizing women's inequality to
men. 7 Feminist method proceeds through consciousness-raising. 8
"Consciousness-raising is a vivid expression of self-creation and
responsibility."8 9 Its goal is individual and collective empowerment. 90 As an

81. ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE, 1966-1978 16
(1980).
82. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN INCULTURE & SOC'Y 635, 637 (1983).
83. LERNER, supra note 2, at 12-14.
84. Id.
85. Rifin, supra note 48, at 83 (citing RICH, supra note 81, at 78).
86. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence ofFeministJurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.

1373, 1384 (1986). The term "to question everything" comes from Adrienne Rich, who claims

"one of feminism's tasks is to question everything. To remember what it has been forbidden
even to mention." RICH, supra note 81, at 13.
87. CATHARINEMACKINNON, TOWARDA FEMINISTTHEORY OFTHE STATE 242 (1989).
88. Scales, supra note 86, at 1401.
89. Id. at 1402.
90. KatharineT. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829,864 (1990).

470
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individual and collective process, it supplies the means through which
women's voices will be included. 9
Feminist legal scholars have employed the feminist method of
consciousness- raising in their quest to define a feminist jurisprudence.
Feminist legal scholars contend that a "separation thesis" underlies
jurisprudence and that modem legal theory is "essentially and irretrievably
masculine."9' 2 Legal theory assumes a definition of human being which
precludes women as defined by feminism.93 Feminist legal scholars seek to
depict ajurisprudence in which women's relational stance is encompassed, not
marginalized. Built upon "feminist insights into women's true nature,"94 it
helps envision a world without patriarchy. 95 Feminist jurisprudence envisions
a reconstructed legal order, one which includes and celebrates "women' s ways
of knowing.""
VI. WHAT MEDIATION CAN LEARN FROM FEMINISM
The great promise of mediation emerges from its alternative nature.
Similarly, the opportunities advanced by a vision of feministjurisprudence are
expansive because they too are unlimited by the historic, the traditional, and
the status quo. Both concepts are formulated, reformulated, discussed, argued,
applied, and criticized from and within a variety of arenas. As marginalized
ideologies, both feminism and mediation share the privilege of creating a
perspective that is not based on the patriarchal, hierarchal, linear framework
which provides society the tools to disembowel, disenfranchise, and quiet the
disharmonious voices. However, as especially apparent in the mediation
debate, the conversation lulls because many of its commentators speak within
the confines of the established discourse.' As feminists have long recognized,
the master will not provide the means to tear down his castle. 91 Hence, like

91. Karst, supra note 64, at 505 (citing S. ROWBOTHAM, WOMAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS,
MAN'S WORLD 33 (1973)).
92. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. C-II. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
93. Id. at 42.
94. Id. at 4. This perspective is in opposition to what is commonly accepted as the
prevailing view, that of masculine insights assumed to define human nature. Id.
95. Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist
Jurisprudence, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 64, 67 (1985).
96. WOMEN's WAYS OF KNOWING (Mary F. Belenky et al. eds., 1985).
97. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 7.
98. AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in
SISTER/OUTSIDER 112 (1984).
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feminist discourse, dialogue on and about mediation needs to find its own
language. 99
Incorporated into the mediation debate, feminist jurisprudence invites
a reformulation of the mediation process, a formulation that includes women's
voices and provides an arena in which women are encouraged and
empowered. Feminism retains the promise of returning law to its original
purpose, "to decide the moral crux of the matter in real himan situations."' 00
Mediation, directed toward persons as opposed to law, which is directed
toward acts,' 0 ' offers a means by which to accomplish this return.
The first step toward a feminist jurisprudence is "to claim women's
concrete reality.""1 2 Next, women need to recognize that individual rights in
law embody male forms of power over women.'0 3 For women, the process of
mediation moves away from the individual rights emphasis imbued in the
American legal system and allows a recognition and empowerment of ways
women connect with themselves and others. A feminist jurisprudence allows
"women to speak for themselves.""'° Looking at mediation outside the legal
framework provides a forum in which women cannot only speak for
themselves but can speak in a language which is familiar to them.
Carol Gilligan's seminal book, In a Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development,posits that women see themselves and act
from a perspective of relationships while men are more likely to operate from
a perspective of logic and rules. 5 The male mode of moral reasoning, the
"logic of the ladder," differs from the female "ethic of care."'" Male
reasoning creates a hierarchal "ethic of justice" while female reasoning is
based on the structure of the web.'0 Women operating from an "ethics of
care" consider responsibilities to others in decision-making.' In contrast,
men, using an "ethics of justice" framework, focus on individual rights, the
use of rules and a concept of fairness."° Those persons operating from an

99.

See Blaustone, supra note 35, at 254 ("[lIt was time to craft an epic story which put

the issues in a different form for dialogue."); Wishik, supra note 95, at 76.

100. Scales, supra note 86, at 1387.
101. Fuller, supra note 17, at 328.
102. MACKINNON, supra note 87, at 244.
103. Id.
104. See Christine A. Littleton, FeministJurisprudence:The Difference Method Makes,
41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 755 (1989).
105.

See CAROL GIUJGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PsYcHOLoGIcAL THEORY AND

WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 24-63 (1993).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 141-142.

109. Idat 48, 73.
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ethic of care see problems in light of the persons involved."I° The ethic of care
challenges the premise of separation underlying the notion of rights, and
focuses on the way individuals experience those rights.I"Moreover, the use
of an ethic of care seeks to fulfill the needs of all involved, as in mediation,
rather than satisfying one person as a winner, as in litigation." 2 Furthermore,
an ethic of care incorporates "how the dilemma is resolved: the process by
which the parties communicate may be crucial to the outcome." ' "3
An emphasis on rights "authorize[s] the male experience of the world,"' 4
stressing separation of the individual from the group."' Feminist theory
uncovers the social dimension of individual experience and the individual
dimension of social experience." 6 Feminist theory is concrete, growing out of
direct experience, and acknowledging the importance of identifying that
experience and "claiming it for one's own."' " A feminist jurisprudence offers
women a chance to tell true stories of their lives, and mediation offers the
forum through which those stories can be told. Because mediation does not
defer to or rely on the rules and procedures inherent in the courtroom, its
flexibility allows women to speak for themselves, about themselves, and put
into the discussion issues and concerns not recognized by the adversarial legal
system. " As a process, mediation affords participants working from an ethic
of care a forum from which to change the adversarial rules and to preserve
relationships. '
Feminist method employs practical reasoning, acknowledging the
multifaceted dimension of conflicts, which call not for one concrete
resolution, but rather "imaginative integrations and reconciliations. " 2 The
use of practical reasoning allows the context of the situation to define not only
the problem resolution but also to define what the problem is.' Mediation,
likewise, strives to help disputants "understand themselves and relate to one

110. Id.at3l.
111. Schneider, supra note 6, at 614.
112. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyerin8 Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 46 (1985).
113.

Id. at47.

114. MacKinnon, supra note 82, at 658.
115. Schneider, supra note 6, at 595.
116. Id.at 603.

117. Id. (citing ANDREA JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 11 (1983)).
118. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979).

119.
120.
121.

Gu.UGAN, supra note 105, at 44.
Bartlett, supra note 90, at 851 (quoting A.RORTY, MIND INACTIoN 274 (1988)).
Bartlett, supra note 90, at 851.
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another through and within conflict.' 22 "Feminist practical reasoning
challenges the legitimacy of the norms of those who claim to speak, through
rules, for the community.'1 2 Participants in mediation are not bound by
defining the dispute in legal categories; hence, they are able to address
feelings and perceptions relevant to the dispute."2 Feminist practical
reasoning integrates emotion and intellect, opening up new possibilities of
analysis. 25 Those operating from an ethic of care express concern for the
other disputant, 26 as well as the social contingencies of the dispute.'"
Mediation, especially transformative and facilitative, strives to explore
multiple issues involved in the dispute and offers a "potential means to
integrate the concern for right and justice and the concern for caring and
interconnection. ' ' 28
Alternative dispute resolution in general, and mediation in particular,
offer a potential for kindness which is lacking in adjudication. 29 "The
tendency of women to defer to another's point of view, insofar as it arises out
of empathy and moral concern is a quality much needed in a society of
growing racial and ethnic diversity."'"' Gilligan's recognition of the
differences between men and women's moral stances does not suggest that the
Rather,
female "web" is the result of women's dependent condition.'
woman's morality provides an "outlook recognizing the claims of both the
actor's own well-being and 'the guiding principle of connection.""113 2 In its
pure sense, women's web-based morality is not less than men's ladder-based
morality, but merely a different perspective. It is regarded as less than the
prominent view of morality because it has incorporated women's second-class
citizenry and the corresponding stereotypes.
The feminist method of consciousness-raising offers a means by which
to expand perceptions' 33 and transform the image of women's relational stance
122.
123.
124.
Traditions,
125.

126.
127.

BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 4.
Bartlett, supra note 90, at 855.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of
Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 3 NEG. J. 217, 226 (1995).
Bartlett, supra note 90, at 857.
G[LUGAN, supra note 105, at 135-36.

Id. at 100.
BUSH & FOLGER,supra note 16, at 5. But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 124, at
230-239 (book review of Bush & Folger, arguing that the concept of transformative mediation
is vague and presumptuous).
128.

129. Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J.ON DiSP. RESOL 211, 246-47. (1995).
130. Karst, supra note 64, at 491.
131. Id. at 484.
132. Id. (citing Gilligan, supra note 105, at 57-100).
133. Bartlett, supra note 90, at 863.

NORTHERN ILINOIS UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

from a subordinate position to one of strength. Because the goal of
consciousness-raising is individual and collective empowerment, 3 4 this
message correlates with mediation's transformative potential.135 For women,
mediation provides an opportunity to employ consciousness-raising as a
means to help change public perceptions of women by "articulating one's
experiences and making meaning of them with others who also articulate their
experiences.' 3 6
Karst envisions a goal wherein social and legal institutions are redefined
to include women's perspective and to meet women's needs. 3 Rather than
incorporating a perspective from the ladder, Karst argues that women use,
employ and define power as "the capacity to provide care for others in the
network of connection.' ' 38 Law generally operates on a zero-sum basis, 3 9 that
is, one pie that must be divided and the winner gets the bigger piece,' 4 while
mediation incorporates the option of expanding the pie so that everyone is
satisfied. The ethic of care imposes a demand to convert the zero-sum basis
of litigation to a more positive sum game.14 ' Mediation invites a view of
disputes as "a world of expanding resources to be shared through concern of
the Other and a recognition of interdependence.'1 42 The reliance of law on
abstract universality, divorced from the individuals involved in a dispute, has
"no bridge to the concrete by which to ascertain the emerging and cultural
qualities which constitute difference."143
Implicit in this process of reconstructing dispute resolution is a rejection

of the relational-autonomy dichotomy, which weaves its power in commentary

analyzing the effects of mediation on women. Perspective needs to be beyond
and outside those boundaries which continue to formulate the questions and
issues as either/or; mediate or adjudicate; win/win or win/lose; masculine or
feminine; right or wrong. If feminists within the legal system are serious about

134.

Id. at 864.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Bartlett, supra note 90, at 863-864.
Karst, supra note 64, at 486.
Id.at 487.
Karst, supra note 64, at 487.
See generally,Carrie Menkel Meadow, Is Altruism Possiblein Lawyering?, 8 GA.

141.

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PortiaRedux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and

See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16; DEBORAH M. KOLB, WHEN TALK WORKS:
PROFILES OF MEDIATORS (1994); THE POSSIBILrrY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF
AMERICAN COMMUNrTY JUSTICE (Sally Engle Merry and Neal Milner, eds., 1993).
135.

ST. U. L. REV. 385 (1992).

Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 75, 94 (1994).

142. Cf., Id.at 94 n.91 (discussing in the context of substantive legal rules along with
ethical rules and norms).
143. Scales, supra note 86, at 1377.
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expressing their voice and being heard, the tune must be different, using new
instruments and playing different chords.
In discussing feminist theory, Joan W. Scott states:
We need theory that can analyze the workings of patriarchy
in all its manifestations - ideological, institutional,
organizational, subjective - accounting not only for
continuities but also for change over time. We need theory
that will let us think in terms of pluralities and diversities
rather than of unities and universals. We need theory that
will break the conceptual hold, at least, of those long
traditions of (Western) philosophy that have systematically
and repeatedly construed the world hierarchically in terms
of masculine universals and feminine specificities. We need
theory that will enable us to articulate alternative ways of
thinking about (and thus acting upon) gender without either
simply reversing the old hierarchies or confirming them.
And we need theory that will be useful and relevant for
Feminist theory and feminist
political practice.'"
jurisprudence offer a variety of means through which
mediation can maintain its alternative characteristics and
provide a woman-friendly forum in which women are
imbued with equal footing. Viewed from these perspectives,
mediation offers women an opportunity for empowerment
away from the mediation table through recognition of
women's strengths on their own merits. Feminist theory
supplies the potential of re-envisioning the framework,
while feminist jurisprudence affords the opportunity to
build a framework "built upon feminist insights into
than upon masculine insights
women's true nature, rather
45
into 'human' nature.""1

144. Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Differences: Or, The Uses of
Posistructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMiNIST STUDIES 33 (1988). Scott looks to
poststructuralism to achieve this theory, analyzing the poststructural concepts of language,
discourse, difference, and deconstruction and applies those concepts to the equality-versusdifference debate. Id. at 34.
145. West, supra note 92, at 3-4.
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V. IS MEDIATION DANGEROUS TO WOMEN?

As the definition of mediation is currently debated in alternative dispute
resolution circles, one issue of concern is the effects and consequences of
mediation for women."4 Trina Grillo's provocative piece, The Mediation

Alternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, argues that mandatory mediation

as a process is dangerous for women. 47 Basing this perspective on women's
inclination to a more relational stance and a variety of other socially-begotten
ills facing women, Grillo equates women's experience of mandatory
mediation as akin to a "psychic rape.""' Grillo analyzes mandatory divorce
and custody mediation in California, concluding that mandatory mediation is
"neither a more just nor a more humane alternative to the adversarial system
of adjudication of custody," and thus, fails to fulfill its promise as a viable
alternative to traditional adjudication. 49
Feminists and non-feminists alike argue that because women employ a
relational stance, they are in danger in the mediation process of stressing
compromise over assertion of their rights and will be more willing to reach an
agreement which does not serve their needs. 5 Mediation is currently
mandated or made available in a variety of family-centered disputes, including
divorce, custody, and domestic violence. Mediation is perceived as

particularly harmful to women who have been abused by their male
partners.' The power imbalance developed in the relationship follows the
couple into mediation, thus offering the female participants less bargaining
power. Justifications for use of mediation in these disputes include avoidance
of the hostility and psychological costs inherent in litigation and the positive
view that disputant-determined agreements are less destructive to family
relationships." ' Other advantages cited for the process include reduced costs,
53
efficiency, user satisfaction and increased access to the legal system.

146. See M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics of Compromise: A Feminist Perspective on
Mediation, 14/15 MEDIATION Q. 163 (Winter 1986/Spring 1987).
147. See Trina GriUo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). Grillo analyzed mandatory mediation for child custody disputes, and

hence raises concerns particular to that subject. However, many of her criticisms are directed
toward and can be broadened to incorporate other mediation processes and topics.
148. Id. at 1605.
149. Id. at 1549.
150,
151.
152.

153.

See id.
at 1549-1550.
Treuthart, supra note 14. at 721.
Id. at 717.

Id
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Grillo recognizes that the "Western concept of law is based on a
patriarchal paradigm,"' 54 emphasizing hierarchy, linear reasoning, the use of
abstract principles to resolve disputes and the ideal of a reasonable person.
Mediation, she argues, eliminates both abstract principles and context as
decision-making bases, leaving women participants in vulnerable positions,
especially women who are taking the first steps to independence by leaving
a marriage.' She finds that mediation can deprive women of the opportunity
6
to have their perceptions validated by a judge and indirectly, society.'"
Mediation holds the potential to incorporate the "feminine search" for
context,' focusing on the relationships and issues individual to the particular
dispute. In divorce and custody mediation, Grillo finds troubling the
minimization of fault and the emphasis on cooperation, suggesting that it
results in a lack of predictability (of results) and often harms the least
58
powerful party, whom she assumes will be the woman participant.' Grillo
seemingly criticizes mediation for the very perception that underlies her
position, that women are incapable of standing up for themselves, for their
rights as they perceive them, and for stating or even knowing what it is they
want. For example, she states that mediation that uses a family systems
approach, which she describes as imposing a value-free universe, fails to
acknowledge the unequal power that society assigns to men and women and
59
the influence of socialization based on societally-imposed sex roles. She
argues that mediation can "deprive a divorcing spouse of the opportunity to
appear virtuous in society's eyes and her own.""w Counseling, not mediation,
would be a more appropriate forum for a woman who looks to society for a
self-definition of virtue. Society will provide only the image of woman that
serves to deny self-definition. Society will give the very definition of woman
that mediation works to combat, a passive, quiet, obedient woman, ultimately
responsible for the household and childcaring, in addition to full-time
employment.

154. Grillo, supra note 147, at 1547.
155. Id. at 1557.
156. See id. at 1560-1561 (basing her arguments on mandatory child custody mediation.
Hence, the wife or ex-wife seeks validation by the judge that she is a better parent or her exhusband is the guilty party).
157. Id. at 1557.
158. Id. at 1558-1560. Grillo does acknowledge that ade-emphasis on abstract principles
may nake sense in an increasingly pluralistic society, where, for example, family means
different things to different people. Id. at 1560.
159. Id. at 1561-62.
160. Id. at 1562.
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While arguing that mediation operates in a value-free universe, Grillo
criticizes what she sees as the subtle but damaging influence of a mediator."'
For example, she claims that expression of anger, especially by women, is
discouraged in mediation, as mediators accept "the societal taboos against the
expression of anger by women."' 62 If anger is accepted, Grillo says it is
allowed merely as "venting," and is not taken seriously enough, depriving
women of the opportunity to be energized by their anger. Thus, as products of
society, mediators bring into the process the very same values Grillo argues
are absent from it. Furthermore, Grillo presents seemingly contradictory
perspectives of women: they are too cooperative and will be taken advantage
of and they are angry and deprived of an opportunity to stand up for
themselves through expression of their anger.
Professor Joshua Rosenberg, in response to Grillo, speculates that the
mediation sessions analyzed in Grillo's article were merely examples of poor
mediation and do not indict the entire process. 63 Grillo's article represents a
commentary of mediation that examines the process through an adversarial
perspective and in doing so, fails to incorporate either the alternative nature
of the process and how it can be a better forum than the courtroom for women.
For example, in discussing mediation's inability to provide a sense of
vindication for divorcing women, Grillo does not acknowledge that a goal of
mediation is the opportunity for parties to see the other's perspective, not
vindication.'" Mediation's focus on problem-solving puts Grillo's concern
about women's ability (or inability) to express anger in a different context
also. Mediation is not about blame but about compromise. As Rosenberg
discusses, blame serves to distract from the focus of the mediation session. 65
He notes that the benefit of mediation is the opportunity for parties to be
heard, to have a voice, and from this opportunity women will gain self-worth.
As Rosenberg points out, mediation as a process is not accountable for
the problems which Grillo discusses, however, he acknowledges that it is
important to the mediation dialogue to bring these issues into the discussion.'"

161. Id. at 1588-1594.
162. Id. at 1575-1577.
163. Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense ofMediation, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 467 (1991).
164. Id. at 474. ('Unlike courts, mediators may attempt to "orient the parties towards
reasonableness and compromise, rather than moral vindication'...."), id. (citing Grillo, supra
note 147, at 1560, 1578).
165. Id. at 475-483.
166. Id. at 468-470.
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The use of mediation for family law issues raises several concerns.

67

Critics

contend that mediation can be effective only if the following criteria are
satisfied, none of which, it is argued, are met in family law issues. First, the
issue must be capable of being resolved through modification of perceptions,
attitudes, and/or behavior.' Secondly, there must be relative parity of power
between the parties." Third, the issue in dispute must be one which does not
involved must
require punishment, deterrence or redress. 7° Lastly, the parties
7
'
agreement.
an
out
carrying
and
into
entering
be capable of
Laurie Woods contends that intra-family disputes are conflicts "between
persons with distinctly differing and conflicting interests,"' 72 and as such, are
not amenable to settlement through mediation. On the other hand, mediation
of family issues is proclaimed as more advantageous to dispute participants
than the courtroom battle and offers dispute resolution in the "nature of
relationships rather than individual rights.', 73 Grillo's contention that women
are endangered by participation in the mediation process needs to be reexamined through a feminist jurisprudential lens. Viewing women and
mediation in this manner puts women in mediation at an advantage over
women participating in the adversarial system, where they have little, if any
voice at all. Mediation's focus on relationships and their contexts appears
tailor-made for women, who, in Grillo's words, "see 7themselves and judge
their own worth, primarily in terms of relationships."' 1

VI. APPLYING A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENTIAL LENS
Incorporated within the patriarchal legal framework with its emphasis on
autonomy and individual rights, mediation's ability to provide a true
alternative forum, especially for women, is not only limited, but impossible,
for "[liaw is powerful as both a symbol and a vehicle of male authority."'"
Furthermore, when establishing a mediation process based on the patriarchal

167. See Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically DisadvantageWomen? 2
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1995); see also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly, Divorce
Mediationand the Politicsof Power, 40 BUFF.L. REV. 441 (1992); MARTHA A. FiNEMAN, THE
ILLUSION OF EQUA.ITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 144-46 (1991).

168. Laurie Woods, Mediation:A Backlashto Women's Progresson Family Law Issues,
19 CLEARINGHOUSE REviEW 431, 435 (1985).

169.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Brinig, supra note 167, at 3.
Grillo,supra note 147, at 1603.
Rifkin, supra note 48, at 84.
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hierarchy established and maintained through the legal system, the same
process dangers which provide the justification for creating an alternative
forum outline the framework for mediation.
The law's image of women is "largely a male product, for it is men who
have held the power to define roles and institutions in our society."' 7 6
Catharine MacKinnon observes of male dominance that "[ilts force is exercised as consent, its authority as participation, its supremacy as the paradigm
of order, its control as the definition of legitimacy., 177 Furthermore,
MacKinnon states, "[t]he law sees and treats women the way men see and
treat women."' 78 In his article, Woman's Constitution,Kenneth Karst recognizes this limitation, suggesting that "[tihe same male conception of society
underlies the very constitutional doctrine that women seek to use in effecting
a reconstructed order of male-female relations."' 7 9 He posits an alternative
conception, one in which the legal system recognizes women's values.' 8°
When women enter mediation assuming the subordinate position
assigned them by the legal system, the potential gender imbalance is due not
so much to the participants' characters as to the images of their gender. 8 '
Because mediation is "commonly directed, not toward achieving conformity
to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant norms themselves,"' 8 2
mediation offers women an opportunity to step out of their socialized image
and speak for themselves.
A New Mexico study, which examined women and minorities in

adjudicated versus mediated cases, looked at whether women and minorities
fared worse than males and non-minorities; whether there is a greater disparity
in results in mediated as compared to adjudicated cases, and whether the

disparity is lessened or removed when the mediator is a woman or minority.'83
The study indicates that women did not fare worse financially between

176. Karst, supra note 64, at 448.
177. MacKinnon, supra note 82, at 639.
178. Id. at 644.
179. Karst, supra note 64. at 449.
180. Id.
181. See Nancy A. Burrell, et al., Gender-Based Perceptual Biases in Mediation, 15
Comm. RES. 447, 453-454 (1988).
182. Fuller, supra note 17, at 308.
183. See MICHELE HERMANN, ET Al, METROCOURT PROJECT FINAL REPORT: A STuDY
OF THE EFFEcrs OF ETHNICITY AND GENDER INMEDIATED AND ADJUDICATED CASES AT THE

METROPOLITAN COURT MEDIATION CENTER (1993). The study looked at small claims civil cases
in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The hypotheses tested were whether alternative dispute
resolution processes, such as mediation, are more susceptible to bias and prejudice
disproportionately impacting women and minorities.
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adjudicated or mediated cases.' 84 White women reported greater satisfaction
with adjudicated rather than mediated outcomes and were less likely than
other study participants to see mediation as fair and unbiased.' 85 Minority
women reported the greatest level of satisfaction with mediation.8 6 Similarly,
Rosenberg notes that in his experience, mediation as a process is supportive,
empowering and enlightening to the participants."'n
CONCLUSION

From their position as outsiders, feminists, and women in general, have
the ability to see possibilities which exist outside the traditional legal
framework, offering the possibility of transforming "the legal emphasis from
one of rights to one of needs."' 8 Thus mediation, with its emphasis on
resolving disputes in a manner which best suits both parties' needs provides
the tools with which women are already familiar but have been subsumed to
an inferior position in the adversarial, rights-based legal system.
Applying a feminist lens, Janet Rifkin suggests that dialogue about
mediation has not included discussion on how "mediation in theory reflects
'a new jurisprudence, a new relation between life and law."" 89 She argues that
the study of mediation from a feminist perspective focuses on questions in
conflict with legal pedagogy."9 Rifkin calls for exploration of whether
mediation incorporates the patriarchal structure of law or challenges it.,"
As the dialogue expands in the area of feminist jurisprudence, scholars
and practitioners in the alternative dispute resolution field should travel down
a similar path, for the evolving feminist jurisprudential concept offers the
mediation field theories which hold the promise that mediation is an
appropriate forum in which women can resolve disputes. As feminists

184.

Id. The study indicated that minority participants in mediation consistently paid

more than non-minority participants and that minority participants expressed more satisfaction

with mediation. Id. But see Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Genderand Race Discriminationin Retail
Car Negotiations,104 HARv. L. REv. 817 (1991) (documents adverse effects of race and gender

bias in informal car negotiations). The study also found women paid less in mediation than
adjudication, doing better than males. Id. But see Blaustone, supra note 35, at 257 (core values
exist in the mediation process that are true across cultures, races, and gender).
185. See Hermann, supra note 184 (finding, however, white women achieved more
favorable outcomes in mediation then other groups).
186.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id.

Rosenberg, supra note 163, at 468.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 141, at 90-91.
Rifkin, supra note 8, at 23 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 82, at 645).
Rifkin, supra note 8, at 24.
Id.at 23.
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recognize, the personal is the political. " Further, feminist theory emphasizes
context and the importance of identifying one's experience and claiming it for
one's own. 93 The courts have been unwilling and thus incapable of hearing
women's experiences and modifying laws to take account of those
experiences.'" Mediation, the sole alternative dispute resolution method
which allows the disputants to speak for themselves, holds the promise of
giving women a place where their voices are heard.

192. Schneider, supra note 6, at 602 (quoting ZIU.AH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMNIM &
SEXUALEQUALrrY 11 (1984)).
193. Schneider, supra note 6, at 603.
194. Id. at 609.

